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 ABSTRACT It has long been recognized, by both security researchers and human-computer interaction 
researchers, that no silver bullet for authentication exists to achieve security, usability, and memorability. 
Aiming to achieve the goals, we propose a Multi-fAcet Password Scheme (MAPS) for mobile authentication. 
MAPS fuses information from multiple facets to form a password, allowing MAPS to enlarge the password 
space and improve memorability by reducing memory interference, which impairs memory performance 
according to psychology interference theory. The information fusion in MAPS can increase usability, 
as fewer input gestures are required for passwords of the same security strength. Based on the idea of 
MAPS, we implement a Chess-based MAPS (CMAPS) for Android systems. Only two and six gestures are 
required for CMAPS to generate passwords with better security strength than 4-digit PINs and 8-character 
alphanumeric passwords, respectively. Our user studies show that CMAPS can achieve high recall rates while 
exceeding the security strength of standard 8-character alphanumeric passwords used for secure applications.
 INDEX TERMS Authentication, human computer interaction, graphical user interfaces.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper studies authentication on mobile devices with 
touch screens. As mobile devices such as smartphones 
become increasingly popular, so does the realization that 
security is an important requirement for the use of mobile 
devices in our daily life. In 2013, annual worldwide smart­
phone shipments topped 1 billion for the first time [1]. The 
popularity of these mobile devices is due to a unique set of 
features including ubiquitous Internet access through com­
munication technologies such as Wifi and 4G/LTE, easy 
to use touch-based inputs, and numerous applications and 
games. In the meantime, the security of mobile devices is 
becoming a major concern as device users are storing sen­
sitive data such as personal contacts and utilizing sensitive 
applications like banking and stock trading.
Authentication, the first defense mechanism preventing 
unauthorized access to a mobile device, allows owners of 
mobile devices to unlock and use their devices.
Designing an authentication scheme for mobile devices is a 
challenging task because the scheme should be secure, capa­
ble of generating human-memorable passwords, and usable. 
A secure authentication scheme should have a large password 
space, i.e., a large number of possible passwords. Obviously 
the passwords generated by the scheme should also be easy 
to remember. In this paper, we separate memorability from 
usability to emphasize the importance of memorability. It has 
long been recognized that no silver bullet exists to achieve 
both security and memorability [2]. Obviously with the addi­
tion of a usability requirement, the task becomes even more 
challenging.
The alphanumeric password scheme, which has been used 
for decades for various computer systems, is not suitable for 
mobile authentication. The scheme generally requires a key­
board for quick input of alphanumeric passwords. However, 
most current mobile devices are not equipped with a hardware 
keyboard. Instead, most mobile devices support the touch
VOLUME 6, 2018
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based soft keyboard, which replaces the hardware keyboard 
with an on-screen image map of keys. Due to the limited 
size of the soft keyboard, text input is relatively slow [3] 
and typo-prone, leading to frustrating usability issues. Poor 
usability, in turn, can lead to users choosing short or easy to 
type passwords as a workaround.
In this paper, we propose the Multi-fAcet Password 
Scheme (MAPS) for mobile authentication. Instead of repeat­
ing the same type of information, such as characters in 
alphanumeric passwords and dot connections in Google's 
pattern unlock, MAPS combines information from multi­
ple facets, i.e., multiple types of information, to generate 
passwords. Because of combining information from multiple 
facets, MAPS can generate a huge number of passwords. 
Passwords generated by MAPS are easy to remember because 
(1) MAPS is an authentication scheme based on graphical 
passwords, which have been proven easier to remember than 
alphanumeric passwords [4], (2) MAPS can fuse information 
from multiple facets through a single gesture on the touch 
screen, (3) MAPS can greatly reduce memory interference, 
a psychology effect leading to forgetting, and (4) graphical 
hints designed for MAPS can further increase the memorabil­
ity of passwords. MAPS is also easy to use on mobile devices 
since passwords generated by MAPS can be input on touch 
screens with just a small number of gestures.
The contributions made in this paper are summarized as 
follows:
• We propose a Multi-fAcet Password Scheme (MAPS) 
for mobile authentication. MAPS can generate a huge 
amount of possible passwords. MAPS is also easy to 
remember and easy to use on mobile devices. Based 
on the idea of MAPS, we design and implement a 
Chess-based MAPS (CMAPS) as an example of MAPS.
• We formally analyze the security strength of CMAPS 
and prove that CMAPS is more secure than existing 
mobile authentication schemes. Only 2 and 6 gestures 
are required for CMAPS to generate passwords with 
better security strength than 4-digit PINs and 8-character 
alphanumeric passwords respectively. The advantage is 
because CMAPS can fuse information from multiple 
facets through a single gesture and using multiple facets 
can significantly enlarge the password space.
• We formally analyze the usability of CMAPS and show 
that CMAPS has better usability, since one gesture in 
CMAPS brings a larger amount of information than 
other schemes.
• Our user studies show that CMAPS, with security 
strength exceeding the strength of current mobile 
authentication schemes and exceeding the requirements 
of banking, can achieve high recall rates after one week.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
reviews related work on graphical passwords, mobile authen­
tication, and memory interference. In Section III, we outline 
the threat model considered in this paper. In Section IV, 
we formally define the key criteria for mobile authentication 
methods. In Section V, we first present the design of MAPS
and then use CMAPS as an example to explain the rationales 
behind the design. In Section 6, we theoretically analyze 
the security strength and usability of CMAPS. Section VII 
presents our user studies on the memorability and usability 
of CMAPS. In Section VIII, we discuss the user studies 
and possible extensions of MAPS. We conclude the paper in 
Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review related work on graphical pass­
words, mobile authentication, and gamification.
A. GRAPHICAL PASSWORDS
The original proposal for the graphical password is the US 
patent filed by Blonder [5] in 1996. Blonder's implemen­
tation shows users a number of ‘‘tap regions'' in a prede­
termined image, and requires users to set a password by 
arranging these regions by location and sequence. These 
regions are then hidden from view, leaving only the original 
reference image. To re-authenticate, the user must select the 
‘‘tap regions'' in the same sequence.
It was inferred that a graphical approach provides better 
memorability than traditional passwords because the human 
brain is relatively weak at remembering sequences of num­
bers or letters, but good at processing visual data [5], [6]. 
That assumption was based on the picture superiority effect, 
the notion that humans have a much greater capacity for 
processing and remembering visual data than numbers and 
letters [7]. This hypothesis was eventually supported by fur­
ther research [4]. Tullis et al. [8] shows that graphical pass­
words can remain memorable even years after they are no 
longer in use. CMAPS is also one type of graphical password 
schemes. In addition CMAPS further enhance memorability 
by reducing memory interference through combining multi­
ple facet information.
As graphical authentication schemes gained popularity, 
they were grouped into three categories: recognition-based 
schemes, recall-based schemes, or cued-recall schemes [9]. 
The classification is based on memory tasks as outlined 
in [10]. These three memory operations are handled in dif­
ferent ways. In recognition, the subject is tasked with merely 
identifying if something is familiar, for example asking a 
person if they have seen a certain picture before. Recall 
requires accessing something directly from memory, a more 
challenging task, for example asking a person to reproduce a 
drawing they once made. Cued-recall provides a hint, such as 
the background of the drawing, but again requires the subject 
to draw up something from memory.
In recognition-based schemes, such as Deja Vu [11], 
the user is prompted to identify previously selected images. 
Users initially create a portfolio of images, taken from a large 
set of abstract images consisting of basic fractal and color 
patterns. To authenticate themselves, users must pick images 
from their portfolio out from a number of decoy images. 
Passface [12] is a commercial example of recognition-based 
authentication built for the open market. This software works
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largely in the same way as Deja Vu, except that pictures 
of human faces are used in place of abstract images. Some 
research has suggested that using familiar imagery such as 
human faces weakens graphical schemes, as it opens them 
up to various selection biases [13]. Other research has found 
that people prefer faces from certain groups, for example 
elderly people remember PassFaces passwords better when 
faces of older people are used [14]. Our scheme uses common 
imagery that should not have any age, gender, or cultural 
biases.
Recall-based schemes, such as Draw-A-Secret [6], ask 
users to reproduce a secret drawing or gesture, typically 
with a touch screen or pointing device. Users create a 
Draw-A-Secret password by drawing a gesture on their touch 
screen PDA, and authenticate themselves by reproducing 
it. A gesture is considered a line drawn along the screen. 
Xside [15] is a more recent drawing-based scheme designed 
for touchscreen devices.
Cued-recall schemes, such as Passpoints [16], require 
users to perform actions on specific locations of an 
image or screen. Users of Passpoints are asked to specify 
‘‘click-points,'' areas that need to be touched, in a pre-defined 
image. Authentication is achieved by touching all of the click 
points in the image. The idea is that a user can chose a 
personal image, for example a picture of a star, and chose 
click points that are memorable or meaningful to the user, for 
example the points of the star.
PicassoPass [17], another cued-recall scheme, asks users 
to recall one piece of visual information from up to five 
different layers (color, image, letter, location, and shape). 
For example, a password may consist of the choices: red, 
top left corner, circle. Layers are superimposed over each 
other during authentication. The user effectively picks one 
value from one dimension (layer) at a time to authenticate, 
while other dimensions are used as distractions for potential 
observers.
B. MOBILE AUTHENTICATION 
Various authentication schemes have been implemented in 
mainstream smartphone operating systems. The existing 
authentication schemes trade security for memorability and 
usability.
Authentication on Apple's iOS operating system is based 
on four-digit PINs. A four-digit PIN is entered on a classic 
PIN pad displaying the digits 0-9. Thus only 10,000 pass­
words are possible. This scheme is clearly intended only 
to discourage unauthorized use by adversaries who lack 
time or dedication. Zezshwitz et al. developed SwiPin [18], 
a scheme based on PINs which takes advantage of gesture 
recognition capabilities on mobile devices for input rather 
than classic button pressing.
Android's pattern unlock scheme presents a user with a 
3 × 3 grid of dots.1 Similar to Draw-A-Secret, a user creates
1A larger gird is possible in recent versions of the Android operating
system. We focus on the default size of the grid in this paper. Our analysis 
and conclusion discussed below still holds for larger grids.
a password by drawing lines connecting the dots in a certain 
way. A valid pattern must consist of at least 4 dots, connected 
only by straight lines that can be contained inside the grid. 
The four-digit PIN is also available on Android operating 
system. Recent versions of the Android operating system 
rate it higher in security strength than the pattern unlock 
scheme. Passwords made using this scheme are predictable 
and prone to hotspots; a small subset of Android unlock 
patterns are used by a large portion of users [19] and most 
users tend to use the same heuristic rules to design their 
passwords [20]. TinyLock [21], a pattern lock scheme, can 
achieve high usability, but the total number of possible pat­
terns in a 3 × 3 grid is only 389,112.
The picture authentication scheme developed for 
Windows 8 allows users to upload an image and create a 
password by drawing a series of three gestures on the image. 
For example, the password could consist of drawing a circle 
in the center of the screen, then a diagonal line connecting two 
corners, then a tap in the center of the screen. The direction 
of the circle (e.g. clockwise vs counterclockwise) is signifi­
cant, as well as the direction the lines are drawn. Naturally, 
a certain amount of inaccuracy is permitted when drawing 
the gestures. Microsoft estimates [22] there are roughly 109 
picture passwords using 3 gestures or less and 6 * 1011 picture 
passwords using 4 gestures or less. However, this scheme is 
vulnerable to dictionary attacks [23], [24] that analyze points 
of interest in the reference image. For an image with 10 points 
of interest, there are only about 106 combinations for picture 
passwords of 3 gestures or less and 109 combinations for 
picture passwords with 4 gestures or less [22].
According to our knowledge, this is the first attempt to 
formally define the concept of multi-facet passwords and ana­
lyze their benefits in terms of memory interference, security, 
and usability. We filed a patent on MAPS in 2013 [25].
C. GAMIFICATION
Gamifying security is an idea that seeks to tie secu­
rity mechanisms to games in order to improve security, 
memorability, and usability [26]. For example, the Pass-Go 
graphical system is based on the board game GO [27]. 
Hamari et al. [28] propose that gamifying an experience can 
produce positive effects in learning and user experience. 
Kroeze and Olivier [29] proposes that gamifying authentica­
tion can enhance security via improved user behavior. In this 
paper, we propose CMAPS, an implementation of MAPS 
based on the chess game. Using CMAPS does not require 
any knowledge of chess. In other words, anyone without any 
knowledge of chess can use CMAPS easily, but players of 
chess may experience the benefits of gamification.
III. THREAT MODEL
In this paper, we assume the attacker is interested in accessing 
a mobile device for sensitive data or sensitive applications 
installed on the mobile device. For example, many ser­
vices utilize mobile devices as the key to password recovery 
and the device access allows attackers to compromise these
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services simply by stealing the victim's phone and triggering 
the password recovery process. We also make the following 
assumptions on the attacker's capability:
1) We assume the attacker has physical access to the 
mobile device because (a) the mobile device is stolen, 
(b) the mobile device is decommissioned, or (c) simply 
the owner is away from the mobile device.
2) We assume that the attacker cannot simply disassemble 
the mobile device and obtain the sensitive data or sen­
sitive applications from the storage taken out of the 
device for various reasons such as device encryption.
3) We assume that the attacker cannot obtain the sensitive 
data through network connections over Wifi or 3G/4G 
communications.
4) We assume that the device owner cannot or has not yet 
wiped the device remotely through device protection 
features such as the remote erase feature supported by 
Apple's Find My iPhone/iPad service.
IV. REQUIREMENTS FOR MOBILE AUTHENTICATION
The goal of mobile authentication is to prevent unauthorized 
access or make the cost of unauthorized access as high as 
possible. For mobile devices, authentication schemes should 
satisfy memorability and usability requirements in addition to 
requirements on security strength. The details of the require­
ments are presented below:
Security: The scheme should be capable of generating a large 
amount of possible passwords so that the cost of a brute force 
attack, in terms of time and effort, can be prohibitive. The 
security strength of passwords generated with low counts of 
input gestures is especially important for mobile authentica­
tion because of the need for quick access to mobile devices. 
Memorability: The passwords generated by the scheme 
should be easy to remember. However, usually passwords 
generated by schemes with a larger password space are harder 
to remember. Another challenge to memorability is memory 
interference, which occurs in human memory when informa­
tion to store is similar to information previously stored in 
memory [30]. One example is on alphanumeric passwords, 
which consist of a string of letters and numbers. Memory 
interference may occur when a user tries to remember the lat­
ter part of a long password, or several passwords for various 
accounts. This is because each position of an alphanumeric 
password contains similar information: letters or numbers. 
Memorability is usually evaluated through user studies.
Usability: Mobile devices are becoming increasingly popular 
partly because of their usability. Because mobile devices are 
often used for only moments at a time, it is essential that 
authentication can be finished easily and quickly. In this 
paper, we propose a usability metric based on the number 
of touch gestures required to finish password input on a 
touch screen of mobile devices. The usability of a mobile 
authentication scheme can also be measured by the time to 
finish one authentication. This measure depends on a user's 
skills of using smartphones and a user's familiarity with 
an authentication scheme. In addition to the two objective
measures described above, the usability can also be measured 
subjectively with a user survey to ask for users' opinions on 
the usability of an authentication scheme.
V. MULTI-FACET PASSWORD SCHEME
In this section, we present the design of the Multi-fAcet Pass­
word Scheme (MAPS) and use a Chess-based MAPS as an 
example to explain the rationales behind the design. Then we 
describe graphical hints designed to improve memorability of 
MAPS.
A. DESIGN OF MULTI-FACET PASSWORD 
FOR MOBILE AUTHENTICATION 
The key idea of MAPS is to form a password by fusing 
information from multiple facets. MAPS uses information 
from multiple facets for two purposes: (1) By using infor­
mation from multiple facets, a MAPS scheme can generate a 
large number of possible passwords. (2) Using information 
from multiple facets can increase the memorability of the 
password. Alphanumeric passwords are relatively hard to 
remember partly because of memory interference, as intro­
duced in the previous section: Usually an alphanumeric pass­
word is made by repeating the same type of information 
and the repetition may hinder remembering the beginning 
part of a password when the latter part of the password is 
being memorized [30]. MAPS can reduce memory interfer­
ence greatly because information from different facets is not 
similar to each other. So, MAPS's using information from 
multiple facets leads to both better security strength and less 
memory interference.
To further increase MAPS's memorability and usability, 
we design an information fusion process, which fuses infor­
mation from multiple facets together. An example explaining 
the fusion process is described in the next subsection.
We design MAPS as a graphical password for three rea­
sons: (1) Graphical password schemes, which allow users 
to authenticate themselves by drawing or choosing infor­
mation based on visual input, are easier to remember than 
textual password schemes because of the picture superior­
ity effect [7]: Psychology researches indicate that humans 
have tremendous capacity for processing and remembering 
visual data, far exceeding our ability to process and remem­
ber numbers and letters [31], [32]. (2) For mobile devices 
equipped with touch screens, a graphical password scheme 
is a natural choice. Typing text passwords on soft keyboards, 
supported by most current mobile devices, can be relatively 
slower because of the limited size of the keyboard [33]. 
In comparison with text password input via soft keyboards, 
graphical passwords can be easier to input on these devices. 
(3) Graphical passwords used on touch screens enable fusion 
of information from multiple facets to increase memorability 
and usability. More details on the fusion are explained in the 
next subsection.
To better explain the design of MAPS, we present an 
example MAPS based on the chess game below.
54798 VOLUME 6, 2018
Y. Zhu et al.: CMAPS: Chess-Based Multi-Facet Password Scheme for Mobile Devices IEEEAccess
FIGURE 1. Screenshots of a CMAPS implementation. (a) An example CMAPS password. 
(b) Unlock interface.
TABLE 1. CMAPS facets.B. A CHESS-BASED MAPS (CMAPS)
Figure 1 shows two screenshots of our implementation of 
Chess-based MAPS (CMAPS) developed for Android sys­
tems. A CMAPS user sets a password by placing chess game
pieces onto a classical chess game board with 8 × 8 tiles.2 The 
resulting chess formation is a CMAPS password. An example 
password of CMAPS is shown in Figure 1(a). When the user 
wants to unlock the mobile device later, CMAPS will display 
a blank chess board and the chess game pieces as shown 
in Figure 1(b). The user can try to unlock the system by 
placing the game pieces back onto the game board. If the 
chess formation input by the user is exactly the same as the 
formation set in the password setting phase, the mobile device 
will be unlocked. The ‘‘Edit'' button in Figure 1 allows a user 
to overwrite or empty a game piece on a tile in the chess board.
A user can put a game piece onto the chess board with 
one gesture connecting a selected game piece to a desired 
tile in the board.3 No knowledge of chess is required to use 
CMAPS as (1) CMAPS allows any game piece to be placed 
on any tile in the chess board and (2) CMAPS allows any 
possible chess formation including those illegal in a chess 
game such as a formation with more than two kings. The 
design is to allow a user without any chess knowledge to use 
CMAPS. We also hypothesize that chess skills may help to 
memorize passwords because a user may use a favorite chess 
formation or a formation with some game pieces related by 
attacking or defending for better memorability.
2The size of the chess board in the number of tiles can be adjusted 
according to screen size. According to Fitts's law [34],[35], user interaction 
can be slower and less precise when the size of tiles in a board is smaller, 
especially for smaller screens.
3In the paper, we do not include the order in which game pieces are placed 
onto the board as a part of a CMAPS password. But the order can be included 
as a part of a CMAPS password and the password space can be further 
enlarged.
Facet Choices
Color Black or White
Type of Game Pieces King, Queen, Rook, Bishop, Knight, or pawn
Location of a Game Piece Row and Column Choice on the Board
As an example of MAPS, CMAPS fuses information 
from multiple facets. The facets used in CMAPS, as 
shown in Table 1, include the color of the game piece 
(black or white), the type of the game piece (king, queen, 
rook, bishop, knight, or pawn), and the location of the game 
piece (the row of the desired tile and the column of the desired 
tile). CMAPS fuses the information from these facets with 
one gesture on a touch screen that simply puts a game piece 
onto a chess board.
C. GRAPHICAL HINTS
To further improve the memorability of MAPS, we ask 
users to design graphical hints for their MAPS passwords. 
The graphical hints are kept in the user's memory only: 
(1) CMAPS cannot store graphical hints generated by users. 
(2) CMAPS cannot display any graphical hints to a user when 
the user wants to unlock a device.
For CMAPS, we use the example hints shown in Figure 2 
to help users to create their own graphical hints. The example 
hints are only shown to the participants in our user study for 
the demo purpose only. Our user study shows that participants 
generated interesting graphical hints in various ways. More 
details can be found in Section VII. In Figure 2(a), the game 
pieces represent American football players arranged on a 
playing field, with end zones and the 50 yard line marked 
by black lines. The quarterback, linebackers, receivers, and 
running backs are represented with different game pieces. The 
quarterback is labeled QB and the linemen are labeled LM.
VOLUME 6, 2018 54799
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FIGURE 2. Example graphical hints. (a) A football formation. (b) A family in their home. (c) A basketball game.
The hint in Figure 2(b) simulates a family, with the father rep­
resented by a black king working on a computer, the mother 
represented by a white queen playing piano, the older daugh­
ter represented by a white pawn doing homework on a desk, 
and the younger son represented by a black pawn playing 
video games. In Figure 2(c) the chess formation is used to 
represent two basketball teams playing on a basketball court. 
The two teams are in different colors and players in different 
positions are represented by different types of game pieces.
Unlike pictures in the picture password scheme of 
Windows 8, graphical hints will not make CMAPS vulnerable 
to dictionary attacks. Microsoft's picture password is vulner­
able to dictionary attacks [24] because the picture used in the 
scheme is shown for authentication and hot spots in the pic­
ture, such as facial features in a face picture, make dictionary 
attacks feasible. In CMAPS, an authentication always starts 
with an empty chess board. CMAPS has no knowledge of 
graphical hints and only users know their own graphical hints.
We hypothesize that graphical hints can reduce the popu­
larity of hotspots, which are defined as frequently selected 
spots in graphical passwords. Hotspots in graphical pass­
words enable attackers to launch dictionary attacks [34], 
which can be significantly more efficient than brute force 
attacks on graphical password schemes. In CMAPS, if graph­
ical hints are not used, hotspots such as corners or the center 
of the chess board can be very frequently selected by users for 
ease of remembering. Similarly certain game pieces can be 
selected more often than other game pieces. We hypothesize 
that graphical hints can also reduce the popularity of hotspots 
in the type of game pieces. More analysis on hotspots in 
CMAPS is presented in Section VII.
VI. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we first measure the security strength of 
MAPS and then use CMAPS as an example for security anal­
ysis. We evaluate the security strength of MAPS and CMAPS 
with the size of the password space, i.e., the number of
possible passwords. The size of password space indicates the 
probability of obtaining a password through random guess.
1) SECURITY STRENGTH OF MAPS
Assuming the facets in a MAPS are all independent, we can 
derive the number of possible passwords supported by MAPS 
as follows.
Proposition 1: For MAPS with n independent facets and
mi possible choices in the ith (1 ≤ i ≤ n) facet, the number 
of possible passwords having l times of information fusion
is Πni=1 mli
Each information fusion combines choices from all the 
facets together. So each fusion can have in=1 mi possible
combinations because of the independence. With l times of
information fusion, MAPS can generate in=1 mil different
passwords.
From Proposition 1, we can derive the following corollary.
Corollary 2: The size of the password space generated by 
adding t possible choices to one existing facet is no greater 
than the size of the password space generated by adding one 
more facet with t possible choices when t ≥ 2 and the number 
of existing choices in each facet is greater than or equal to 
two. Only when t = 2 and the facet to add t possible choices 
has only two possible choices before the addition, the two 
methods generate password spaces of the same size.
The proof of Corollary 2 is straightforward as adding a 
facet with t possible choices will enlarge the password space 
by t l times where l is the times of information fusion. The 
proof of Corollary 2 can be found in Appendix A. When t , 
the number of possible choices to add, is small, the size dif­
ference of the password spaces generated by the two methods 
is not significant. But when t increases, the ratio between the 
size of the password space generated by adding one more 
facet of t possible choices and the size of the password space 
generated by adding t possible choices to an existing facet is
mlj/(1+mj/t)l if we assume that the t possible choices are added to
the jth facet and mj denotes the number of possible choices in
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FIGURE 3. Security strength comparison. (a) Number of passwords supported by different number of gestures. (b) Number of passwords supported by 
two, four, and eight gestures.
the jth facet before the addition. When t≫ mj, the ratio4 can 
be approximated as mlj , which grows exponentially with l, 
the times of information fusion. Furthermore, adding more 
facets and splitting the t possible choices into the added facets 
can lead to an even larger password space.
Corollary 2 shows the advantage of MAPS over traditional 
passwords. Traditional passwords such as the alphanumeric 
passwords and four-digit PINs are essentially one- facet pass­
words. MAPS, designed to fuse information from multiple 
facets, can have a significantly larger password space.
2) SECURITY STRENGTH OF CMAPS
In CMAPS, the row and the column are dependent because 
only one game piece is allowed to be placed in one tile of the 
chess board.
Proposition 3: With l gestures, CMAPS with the classical
chess board of eight rows and eight columns can generate 
2l 6l 6l4 possible passwords.
The proof of Proposition 3 can be found in Appendix B.
Based on the results in Proposition 3, we compare CMAPS 
with the PIN-based approach used in Apple's iOS and 
Google's Android system and the alphanumeric password 
schemes in terms of the security strength.5 *For fair compar­
ison, we assume that the same number of gestures are used 
to generate passwords in the password schemes. In iOS, one 
gesture can select one digit to be used in a passcode. For 
fair comparison, we assume a PIN can have more than four 
digits. We assume that one gesture can select one digit or one 
letter in either the upper case or the lower case to be used
4The ratio will increase with t . But adding more facets to share the t 
possible choices can lead to even larger password space.
5We do not include Google's pattern unlock scheme into the comparison
because: (1) A pattern used for a pattern unlock can be finished with one
long gesture connecting multiple dots in a 3 × 3 grid. (2) In the security
setting menu of the Android operating system, the pattern unlock, PIN, and
alphanumeric password are rated as medium security, medium to high secu­
rity, and high security respectively. We do not include the picture password 
in Windows 8 because no design details such as the resolution in a circle 
gesture recognition, i.e., how different two circle gestures can be regarded as 
the same gesture, are available for the quantitative analysis.
in an alphanumeric password, even though for numbers and 
capital letters an additional gesture may be required to swap 
to the numeric portion of the soft keyboard or to press the shift 
key. We do not consider alphanumeric passwords which allow 
special characters. Similarly, we also assume that in CMAPS, 
one gesture can put a game piece onto a desired tile in a chess 
board.
Figure 3, generated based on the assumptions, com­
pares the security strength of the password schemes. From 
Figure 3(a), we can observe: (1) When the number of gestures 
is less than 20, CMAPS can generate many more passwords 
than the PIN-based approach and the alphanumeric password 
scheme. As most of the alphanumeric passwords used for 
banking are between eight and 20 characters long, the secu­
rity strength of CMAPS is higher than the strength required 
for banking, which is also much higher than the security 
strength of current mobile authentication schemes such as 
the PIN-based approach. (2) When the number of gestures 
is larger than 24, the alphanumeric password scheme can 
generate more passwords than CMAPS, but CMAPS can 
still potentially generate about 1020 times more passwords 
than the PIN-based approach. Figure 3(b) shows that two- 
gesture, four-gesture, and eight-gesture CMAPS passwords 
can generate about 2900, 1.3 × 106, and 1.9 × 1010 times 
more passwords than the PIN-based approach respectively 
and about 75, 890, and 8,700 times more passwords than the 
alphanumeric password scheme respectively.
B. USABILITY ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we analyze the usability of CMAPS and 
compare CMAPS with other password schemes in terms 
of usability. CMAPS satisfies the same set of usability 
requirements [35] as existing graphical password schemes on 
mobile devices such as the pattern unlock scheme and the 
picture password scheme. For example, CMAPS does not 
require a user to carry any additional physical object and the 
scheme does not require physical user effort beyond gestures 
on touch screens. In this paper we focus on the ease of
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using the password schemes. We evaluate the usability of the 
schemes with two metrics: the number of gestures required 
to finish one authentication and the actual time needed to 
finish one authentication. Both metrics measure the ease 
of inputting passwords to a mobile device. The difference 
between the two metrics is that the second measure depends 
heavily on a user's familiarity with the authentication scheme 
in a study and a user's skillfulness in using a mobile device.
In this section, we analyze usability with the first metric. 
The second metric is used in the user study presented in the 
next section to evaluate usability with timing data collected 
by the CMAPS application developed for Android smart­
phones. To obtain direct feedback from users on the usability 
of CMAPS, we also ask participants of the user study to 
finish a survey on usability comparison between CMAPS 
and existing schemes and the survey results are presented 
in Section VII.
1) NUMBER OF GESTURES REQUIRED
TO FINISH A PASSWORD
CMAPS users can place a game piece onto the game board by 
a gesture drawing a line between a selected game piece and a 
tile on the chess board. A CMAPS password having l game 
pieces requires l gestures to input.
TABLE 2. Number of Gestures Required for Different Password Strength. 
(For fair comparison, we remove the limit on the number of digits in a 
PIN and the number of dots in the pattern unlock scheme. The numbers 
for the pattern unlock are the lower bounds of segments between
successive dots required to achieve different password strength as we
assume it is possible to connect one dot with any other dot in a grid for
simplification. The numbers for alphanumeric passwords are also the
lower bounds as we assume that an alphanumeric password of l
characters can be completed in l gestures. In reality a user will need to
use an extra gesture to press the shift key or switch from the letter
keyboard to the symbolic keyboard.)
Number of Passwords 1010 1020 1030 1040 1050
PIN 10 20 30 40 50
Alphanumeric 6 12 17 23 28
Pattern Unlock 12 23 34 45 56
CMAPS 4 9 15 22 30
For fair comparison, we assume that passwords generated 
by all the password schemes are of the same level of security 
strength.6 * *Table 2 shows the comparison results. A user can 
finish a pattern in the pattern unlock scheme with one long
gesture that connects a number of dots in a 3 × 3 grid. 
So the gesture connecting multiple dots consists of multiple 
segments between successive dots. A CMAPS password can 
also be possibly completed with one gesture connecting mul­
tiple games pieces to multiple tiles sequentially, as shown in 
Appendix C. For fair comparison, Table 2 shows the number 
of segments, i.e. lines connecting two dots, required to finish 
patterns used in the pattern unlock scheme.
From Table 2, we can observe that CMAPS requires much 
fewer gestures to achieve similar security strength than other
6The metric, number of gestures required for a level of password strength,
is essentially a reverse way to measure the number of passwords supported
by a fixed number of gestures.
approaches when the size of password space is below 1040 *. 
Compared to the pattern unlock scheme and the PIN-based 
approach, CMAPS requires no more than half the gestures 
for password spaces between 1010 and 1030.
VII. USER STUDY
A. OVERVIEW
The goal of the user study is to evaluate the memorability 
and usability of CMAPS. The study has two sessions. Both 
sessions are conducted in a controlled laboratory environment 
to avoid distractions.
During the first session, participants are asked to fill 
out a consent form with demographical information. They 
were asked to provide their age range, gender, educational 
background, skill level of using smartphones, and their 
chess knowledge. Then we continue with an introduction 
on CMAPS. Before leaving the laboratory, participants were 
asked to generate a CMAPS password and recall the password 
successfully on a smartphone.
To simulate regular use of the passwords as in previous 
research [36], we sent an email to the participants two days 
and four days after their first sessions respectively. The emails 
contain a link to an online emulator of the CMAPS applica­
tion hosted on Google Sites. The emulator is based on the 
same code used to generate the application on Android smart­
phones so the online emulator and the smartphone application 
have the same user interface and they function in the same 
way. Participants are encouraged to recall their CMAPS pass­
words through the online emulator. Use of the emulator is 
not mandatory because (1) the email response rates may be 
low and as email communications may not be reliable [37] 
and (2) we would like to compare password memorability of 
participants who used the emulator against memorability of 
those who did not use the emulator to investigate the effect 
of the daily use of CMAPS passwords.
One week after the first session, participants were invited 
to return to the controlled laboratory for the second session. 
Participants were asked to recall their CMAPS passwords 
through the smartphones that they used in the first session. 
Participants were allowed to recall their passwords within five 
minutes. At the end of the second session, participants were 
asked to fill out a survey rating the usability of CMAPS and 
their favorite mobile authentication scheme.
B. APPARATUS
An application of CMAPS was implemented and installed 
on a Samsung Galaxy S4 smartphone configured with the 
Android Jelly Bean (version 4.2) operating system. The 
phone is equipped with a 5in Super AMOLED capacitive
touchscreen with a 1920 × 1080 (441 pixels per inch) display 
resolution. The Android application records attempts made 
by participants and timing information of each attempt. The 
implementation does not enforce any rules of chess. Any 
piece of either color can be positioned on any tile in the chess 
board, and multiple pieces of the same type are permitted
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(e.g. three kings). Only one piece (or no piece) can be placed 
on any particular tile. Two screen shots of the CMAPS appli­
cation on Android smartphones are shown in Figure 1.
C. CONDITIONS
To evaluate the memorability and usability of CMAPS pass­
words with different security strength, we assign participants 
randomly into the following four conditions: (1) 2g: CMAPS 
passwords in this condition must be generated with two 
gestures. (2) 8g: CMAPS passwords in this condition must 
be generated with eight gestures. (3) 8+g: Participants were 
asked to generate CMAPS passwords with more than eight 
gestures. We do not specify a fixed number of gestures in 
this condition to allow participants to generate CMAPS pass­
words with as many gestures as they desire. (4)8+gh:Before 
generating CMAPS passwords in this condition, participants 
were shown graphical hints in Figure 2. The participants 
assigned into this condition were encouraged to generate their 
own graphical hints and create their CMAPS passwords based 
on their own graphical hints. The graphical hints are not 
stored or displayed in the smartphone application.
D. STATISTICAL TESTING
We use a significance level of 0.05 for our hypothesis 
testing unless otherwise specified. For omnibus compar­
isons between categorical and continuous data, we used 
Chi-squared (χ 2) analysis and Kruskal-Wallis (KW) analy­
sis respectively. If the omnibus test is significant, we per­
form pairwise tests with Chi-squared for categorical data and 
Mann-Whitney for quantitative data.
E. PARTICIPANTS
This research was approved by the ethics board of all partic­
ipating universities. We recruited participants by distributing 
fliers and leaflet style advertisements. A ten dollar cash incen­
tive was offered for participants who finished both sessions. 
Sixty-six participants were recruited for the user study and 
54 participants finished both sessions. Of the 54 participants 
who completed the user study, 28 were male and 26 were 
female. Forty participants were undergraduates, 12 were doc­
toral or master students, one was staff, and one declined 
to specify. Twenty eight participants were in engineering 
majors, 11 were in science majors, and 15 in arts and human­
ities majors. Twenty six participants were aged between 
21 and 25 and 20 were aged 20 and under. Participants 
were asked ‘‘Are you skilled at using Smartphones or mobile 
devices.'' On a scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly 
Agree (5), participants rated their skill at using smartphones 
an average of4.07, with 81% of participants rating their skill 4 
or higher.
Among the 66 participants who finished the first session, 
12 participants did not return to finish the second session, 
so the overall dropout rate was 18%. Six of the participants 
who did not complete the second session indicated a schedule 
conflict as their reason for failing to attend. The others did 
not respond to our inquiry after the first session. Of the
12 dropouts, one (8%) was in the 2g condition, two (17%) 
were in the 8g condition, seven (58%) were in 8+g condition, 
and two (17%) were in the 8+gh condition. The dropouts did 
not vary significantly by condition (χ 2 = 5.3, p = 0.15). 
Participant behavior during both sessions was monitored, 
and participants who appeared distracted had their timing 
data excluded from analysis. These participants were still 
compensated as long as they finished both sessions.
F. MEMORABILITY
Table 3 shows the recall rates of CMAPS passwords in 
each condition after one week. The recall rates are 87% 
for CMAPS passwords in 8+gh condition and 100% for 
passwords in the other conditions. The recall results did not
vary significantly by condition (χ 2 = 5.4, p = 0.15). The 
results indicate that CMAPS, with security strength exceed­
ing the strength of current mobile authentication schemes 
and exceeding the requirements of banking, can achieve high 
recall rates respectively.
TABLE 3. Recall rates of CMAPS passwords.
Conditions Participants Recall Recall Rate
2g 8 8 100%
8g 18 18 100%
8 + g 13 13 100%
8 + gh 15 13 87%
To investigate the effect of graphical hints on memorabil­
ity, we compare results in 8+g and 8+gh conditions. The 
comparison results indicate that graphical hints did not have 
significant effect on memorability (χ 2 = 1.87, p = 0.17). 
The results are against our expectation that graphical hints can 
improve memorability of CMAPS. Our conversations with 
participants in 8+g condition revealed that many of them 
already used graphical hints to generate CMAPS passwords 
without any instruction from us. This fact explains the high 
recall rate for passwords in 8+g condition. In the user study, 
participants have created various interesting graphical hints. 
More details on the graphical hints can be found in the 
technical report.
We also investigated the effect of using the online emulator 
between the two sessions on the memorability of CMAPS. 
To simulate the regular use of passwords, we sent two 
emails with a link to the online emulator two days and 
four days after the first session respectively. The majority 
of participants (87%) responded to at least one email by 
recalling passwords through the emulator, with 33% respond­
ing to both. Only two participants failed to remember their 
passwords, and both of these participants responded to one 
email. An omnibus Chi-Squared test on the four conditions 
(response to both emails, response to the first email only, 
response to the second email only, and no response) shows no 
significance(χ2 = 1.68, p = 0.64).Formanyusers,CMAPS 
passwords remain memorable after one week without 
use.
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TABLE 4. Pairwise testing on password entry time.
Comparison Z score P-value
2g vs 8g 1.70 .09
2g vs 8+g 1.04 .30
2g vs 8+gh 2.36 .01
8g vs 8+g 0.11 .91
8g vs 8+gh -1.77 .08
8+g vs 8+gh -2.03 .04
TABLE 5. Average usability rating of CMAPS and other schemes.
Scheme Ratings Convenience Speed
CMAPS-2g 8 4.5 3.88
CMAPS-8g 18 4 3.61
CMAPS-8+g 13 4.08 3.54
CMAPS-8+gh 15 3.67 3.6
4-digit PIN 29 4.48 4.52
Google Pattern 7 4 4.29
Fingerprint 11 4.46 4.64
G. USABILITY
We evaluate the usability of CMAPS with timing data col­
lected by the smartphone application and survey data col­
lected through the usability survey.
1) PASSWORD ENTRY TIME
The smartphone application records timing information 
of each authentication attempt. Participants had only one 
authentication session each, and were not permitted to prac­
tice beforehand. Only timing data from participants whom 
we observed to be distracted during the second session 
was excluded. Examples of distraction include dropping the 
device or accidentally closing/minimizing the application. 
The attempts were excluded because allowing those partic­
ipants another attempt would give them an unfair advantage. 
Roughly 5% of the data was omitted in this manner. The recall 
rates are calculated with the distracted participants included.
We examined the total authentication time, including 
unsuccessful attempts and time that users spent on thinking 
between attempts. Participants required a mean of 10, 21, 
23, and 25 seconds to authenticate themselves in the 2g, 8g,
8+g, and 8+gh conditions respectively. A Kruskal-Wallis 
test using the timing data from the four conditions (2g, 8g,
8+g, and 8+gh) indicates significance (H = 10.998, p < 
0.012). Pairwise Mann-Whitney comparisons between the 
categories show significant differences between 2g and 8g
(Z = 2.69, p = .007), and between 2g and 8+gh (Z = 3.01, 
p = .002). Despite 8+g being slower than both 2g and 8g on 
average, there was no significant difference between 2g and
8+g (Z = 1.27, p = .20). We attribute this result to 3 excep­
tionally fast outliers in 8+g who required 10 seconds or less 
to authenticate themselves. The fastest 70% of users in each 
condition authenticated in a mean of 9, 14, 11, and 19 seconds 
respectively.
The total password entry time for a CMAPS password 
is comparable to other graphical schemes such as Deja 
Vu (31-36s) [11], CDS (20s) [38], Story (23s) [38], and Draw 
a Secret (5-12s) [39].7
We also examined the time spent on only the first suc­
cessful attempt. The time is calculated as time from when 
the screen with the board loads to first correct authentica­
tion, or from previous unsuccessful authentication to suc­
cessful authentication. Participants required a mean of 10, 
14, 14, and 20 seconds for the first successful authentication
7Deja Vu, CDS, and Story use a mouse for input. Draw a Secret is based 
on a touch screen.
attempt in the 2g, 8g, 8+g, and 8+gh conditions respectively. 
As expected, authentication time increases with the number 
of gestures. A Kruskal-Wallis test using the timing data from
the four conditions indicates significance (H = 8.08, p < 
0.044). Table 4 shows pairwise comparisons with the two 
tailed Mann-Whitney test. Both 2g and 8+g show signifi­
cance with 8+gh, however 8g does not, which we attribute 
to a small number of fast outliers in 8g. We attribute the lack
of significance between 8+g and 8g to users in 8+g opting 
to use as few pieces as possible.
The password entry time for one entry of a CMAPS pass­
word is comparable to other schemes such as CDS (14s), 
Story (9s), Xside (3-4s) [15], SwiPIN (4-5s) [18], and Tiny- 
Lock (2-4s) [21]. We note that 4 gesture CMAPS can generate
1.3 × 106 times more passwords than 4-digit PIN or SwiPin, 
and 33,859 times more passwords than the total number of 
possible passwords in Android's pattern unlock or TinyLock 
with a 3 × 3 grid.
The average number of attempts required to authenticate 
also increases with the number of gestures. Participants in 2g,
8g, 8+g, and 8+gh required 1, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.4 attempts 
for each condition respectively. A Kruskal-Wallis test on the
attempts required shows no significance (H = 1.144, p = 
0.767).
We did not conduct a user study on existing mobile authen­
tication schemes to compare CMAPS against existing mobile 
authentication schemes on the password entry time and mem­
orability because the comparison will be biased. Existing 
schemes such as the pattern unlock scheme and the four-digit 
PIN are already being used by the participants. So the par­
ticipants may simply reuse their current passwords in the 
user study. Even if the participants did not use their current 
passwords, their familiarity with the existing schemes causes 
bias in the comparison as they only used CMAPS for a couple 
of times and the existing schemes are being used daily. So we 
conduct a usability survey to compare CMAPS against the 
existing schemes.
2) USABILITY SURVEY
Participants finish a usability survey at the end of the sec­
ond session. In the survey, we asked participants whether 
they agreed with the following statements: (1) the authen­
tication scheme is convenient, and (2) entering a password 
with the authentication scheme is fast. Participants rate 
CMAPS in their condition (2g, 8g, 8+g, or 8+gh), and
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FIGURE 4. Survey results. (a) Entering password convenient. (b) Entering password fast.
whichever authentication scheme is currently used by the par­
ticipant, or their favorite scheme if they do not currently use 
any kind of authentication. The possible choices are strongly 
disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, and strongly agree. For 
quantitative analysis, the choices are converted to 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Figure 4 shows the survey 
results and the average usability rating results are shown 
in Table 5.
Responses from the survey were further sorted as either 
unsatisfactory (1-3) or satisfactory (4,5). Table 6 shows that 
CMAPS has no significant difference in usability among the 
four conditions (2g, 8g, 8+g, and 8+gh).
TABLE 6. Statistical analysis on usability data for CMAPS.
Convenience Speed
x2 P x2 P
Omnibus 3.36 .399 2.56 .465
Category Pairwise Test Result
2g vs 8g 2.10 .147 .181 .671
2g vs 8+g 2.15 .142 .940 .332
2g vs 8+gh 3.41 .065 1.02 .310
8g vs 8+g .003 .955 .523 .470
8g vs 8+gh 3.41 .065 .609 .465
8+g vs 8+gh .509 .476 .068 .795
We further compared CMAPS with authentication schemes 
in use by the participants. Since each participant is only 
asked about CMAPS and the authentication scheme in use, 
only pairwise testing is used for analysis. Table 7 shows our 
results. Not included in the table are the five participants 
who never used another mobile security scheme, the only 
one participant who chose facial recognition, and the only 
one who chose the windows picture password. In terms of 
convenience, participants felt that CMAPS in 8g was not 
significantly different from the four-digit PIN, the pattern 
unlock scheme, and the fingerprint scheme. CMAPS in 8+g 
and 8+gh were rated as significantly less convenient than the 
four-digit PIN. In terms of input speed, CMAPS with more
TABLE 7. Statistical Analysis Comparing CMAPS to Other Schemes. 
(CMAPS results are sorted by gesture. Other schemes are abbreviated for 
brevity. PIN: four-digit PIN, Patt: Google's pattern unlock, print: 
fingerprint scheme. Two categories could not be tested because they had 
perfect ratings. Significant p values are bolded for visibility.)
Convenience Speed
x2 P x2 P
2g vs PIN .284 .594 .284 .594
8g vs PIN .198 .656 7.83 .005
8+g vs PIN 4.01 .045 11.8 .001
8+gh vs PIN 7.50 .006 12.4 .001
2g vs Patt NA NA .268 .605
8g vs Patt 1.85 .174 .907 .341
8+g vs Patt .359 .549 2.03 .154
8+gh vs Patt 3.02 .082 2.16 .141
2g vs print NA NA 3.07 .080
8g vs print 2.84 .092 4.62 .032
8+g vs print 2.90 .089 6.77 .009
8+gh vs print 2.90 .089 7.02 .008
than two gestures was rated lower than the four-digit PIN 
and fingerprint, but was not significantly different from the 
pattern unlock scheme.
The convenience results in Table 4 indicate that user sat­
isfaction to CMAPS in 2g and 8g is at the same level as the 
user satisfaction to four-digit PIN. The results also show that 
user satisfaction to CMAPS in 8g, 8+g, and 8+gh is at the 
same level as user satisfaction to pattern unlock.
From the survey data, we can conclude that CMAPS 
in 2g, with security strength exceeding the strength of current 
mobile authentication schemes, can be used as an acceptable 
alternative to existing authentication schemes such as the 
four-digit PIN in terms of usability. We can also observe 
that CMAPS in 8g, with security strength exceeding the 
requirements of banking, is comparable with current mobile 
authentication schemes in terms of usability.
H. HOTSPOTS
Hotspots, defined as frequently selected spots in graph­
ical passwords [34], enable attackers to launch efficient
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FIGURE 5. Popularity of Tiles (The gray level of each tile indicates the popularity of each tile. The most popular tile and the least popular tiles are in the 
color black and the color white respectively.) From left to right: 2 piece, 8 piece, unlimited (8+) pieces, unlimited (8+) pieces with hints.
FIGURE 6. Popularity of different piece types.
attacks such as the dictionary attack. Hotspots reduce uncer­
tainty in password choices. Graphical schemes that depend 
on pictures or images can be vulnerable to hotspots [40]. 
In this paper we evaluate the hotspot effect with Shannon's 
entropy [41], an information-theoretical measure of uncer­
tainty. The entropy E is defined as follows:
E = -Σi pi log2 pi (1)
where pi denotes the probability of selecting the ith choice. 
In CMAPS, the hotspot effect may exist in the choices on the 
tiles of the chess board and in the choices on the type of game 
pieces.
1) HOTSPOTS IN TILE SELECTION
Figure 5 shows popularity of tiles. We can observe that some 
tiles, particularly the corner tiles, were chosen more often 
than others. Assuming a uniform distribution on the tile selec­
tion, we can calculate entropy Etile uniform = 6.00 bits according
to the entropy defined in Equation 1 as pi = 1/64, 1 ≤ i ≤ 64.
Similarly we can calculate the entropy ECtile, denoted as the
entropy of tile selection in Condition C . According to the 
popularity shown in Figure 5, E2tigle, E8tigle , E8ti+leg , and E8ti+legh are
3.75, 5.25, 5.26, and 5.76 bits respectively. So the hotspots in 
tile selection reduce the uncertainty by 2.25, 0.75, 0.74, and 
0.24 bits in 2g, 8g, 8+g, and 8+gh conditions respectively. 
The reduction in uncertainty, i.e., the popularity of hotspots 
decreases as the number of gestures increases since more tiles 
are to be used. The data also shows that graphical hints can 
reduce popularity of hotspots when we compare the entropy 
of 8+g with the entropy of 8+gh. Overall the entropy of 8g, 
8+g, and 8+gh conditions are very close to the maximum 
entropy of 6.00 bits. The results indicate that when the num­
ber of gestures is larger than eight, the hotspot effect can be 
largely ignored as the popularity of each tile is about the same.
2) HOTSPOTS IN PIECE SELECTION
Figure 6 shows the distribution of piece types. Ideally each 
piece will be selected 100/6 = 17% of the time. Our data 
shows that pawns, rooks, queens, and kings were placed 18%, 
14%, 16%, and 15% of the time respectively. Knights were 
placed 28% of the time, while bishops were placed only 9% 
of the time.
Assuming a uniform distribution on the selection of 
the piece type, we can calculate entropy of piece type 
Etype unifrom = 2.59 bits according to the entropy definition
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FIGURE 7. Example graphical hints created by users.
in (1) as pi = 1/6, 1 ≤ i ≤ 6. Similarly we can cal­
culate the entropy Etype C, denoted as the entropy of piece
type selection in Condition C . According to the popularity
shown in Figure 6, E2tygpe , E8tygpe , E8ty+pge , and E8ty+pgeh are 2.31, 
2.52, 2.44, and 2.34 bits respectivel+y. The resu+lts show the 
number of gestures does not have a predictable effect on 
hotspots in piece type. We can also observe that the entropy 
of each condition is very close to the maximum entropy 
of 2.59 bits. It indicates that the hotspot effect can be largely 
ignored.
I. GRAPHICAL HINTS CREATED BY PARTICIPANTS 
Users in the 8+gh condition used an average of 13.6 pieces 
with a median of 12. Only 20% of users in this category chose 
to use 8 pieces exactly.
At the end of the experiment, we asked some 8+gh par­
ticipants to describe their graphical hints. Some user gener­
ated hints are presented here. Figure 7 shows some exam­
ple graphical hints created by participants. Password (a) 
is based on chess. The knights are used as a reference. 
Each knight is attacking a queen, which is covering a 
pawn. A pawn of the queen's color sits in the corner. Pass­
word (b) is the letter H, with colors swapped between the 
two sides. The bulk of the vertical lines are made up of 
rooks, but the top and bottom of each line is capped with 
a unique piece, and the horizontal center line is made from 
kings.Password (c) represents a casino floor. The play tables 
are on red tiles, denoted with knights. Pit bosses, denoted 
as queens, watch the tables from the white tiles between 
them. Password (d) is a house. The floor or foundation is 
built from white rooks, and the remainder from black rooks. 
Two women, their bodies made of pawns and their heads 
made of queens, sit inside the house. Password (e) is a 
cricket field, with different pieces denoting different players 
around the two wickets. The queen is the user's favorite 
player.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the impact of chess knowledge to
the memorability of CMAPS and an extension of CMAPS to 
reduce or even eliminate side effects of password expiration 
policies.
A. IMPACT OF CHESS KNOWLEDGE
Participants indicated whether or not they could play chess 
by answering yes or no in the consent form. Ignoring the 
participants who did not answer, 81% answered yes, 19% 
answered no. Only two users forgot their passwords, one that 
knew how to play chess and one that did not. Thus we find 
that chess knowledge does not have significant impact on 
remembering the password (χ 2 = .26, p = 0.61), and it 
means that CMAPS passwords are memorable even to people 
with no knowledge of chess.
B. EXTENSION
To foil an attacker who obtains the older password through
various possible ways such as brute force attacks, intercep­
tion, or simply guessing, system owners or administrators 
prefer expiring old passwords every few months or weeks 
and asking system users to generate new passwords. While 
the password expiration policies can possibly help secure the 
system by reducing the time that an attacker has to access 
the system, the password expiration policies can cause extra 
burden on system users such as interruption of ongoing work 
and increase in login errors. Zhang et al. [42] even reported 
that the knowledge of old passwords can help in breaking new 
passwords.
MAPS can be extended to reduce or eliminate the side 
effects of the password expiration policies. The extension is 
to add a game facet to MAPS. In other words, when a user 
is required to change an old password based on one game, 
the user can select another game and form a new password 
based on the new game. To better reduce or eliminate side 
effects, the systems may use games that are as different as 
possible. For example, if the old password is based on chess, 
the system may suggest the user to use the game Monopoly 
for the new password.
The game change can help reduce memory interference 
in long term memory, which is used for continuing storage 
of information [30], as the new game is completely different 
from the old game and the passwords formed based on the 
different games are less likely to cause memory interference.
The addition of the game facet can also prevent breaking 
new passwords based on the knowledge of old passwords. 
MAPS based on different games may have different sets of
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facets so no connection between new passwords and old pass­
words is available. For example games chess and Monopoly 
have different sets of game pieces/rules and completely dif­
ferent game boards.
We plan to perform a user study on the extension in 
our future work. Since passwords usually expire every 
3 months or 6 months, the user study may take a long time.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose MAPS for mobile authentication.
MAPS can improve security, memorability, and usability
jointly. MAPS fuses information from multiple facets to 
form a password. Using information from multiple facets can 
improve security strength by enlarging the password space 
and improve memorability by reducing memory interference. 
The graphical hints can help users to memorize passwords. 
Based on the idea of MAPS, we implemented CMAPS for 
Android devices and conducted a user study on CMAPS with 
the implementation. The user study shows that CMAPS, with 
security strength exceeding the strength of current mobile 
authentication schemes and exceeding the requirements of 
banking, can achieve high recall rates. CMAPS enhances 
usability by requiring significantly fewer touch gestures than 
other schemes to achieve an equivalent password space.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PASSWORD SPACE OF MAPS
Proof: First the number of existing choices in each facet 
has to be greater than or equal to two. If there is only one 
possible choice in one facet, the facet can be removed and the 
size of the password space will not change. So if we denote 
the number of possible choices in the jth facet as mj, mj ≥ 2. 
Without loss of generality, we assume the t possible choices 
are added to the jth facet, so the size of the password space 
generated by adding the t possible choices, denoted as S1, can 
be derived according to Proposition 1 as follows:
where n denotes the number of existing facets and l denotes 
the times of information fusion. The size of the password 
space generated by adding one more facet of t choices, 
denoted as S2, can be derived according to Proposition 1 as
follows:
where n denotes the number of existing facets and l denotes 
the times of information fusion. Since t ≥ 2 and mj ≥ 2, 
we can derive
(t - 1)(mj - 1) ≥ 1. (4)
After simplification on Inequality 4, we can derive
tmj ≥ t + mj. (5)
Combining Equation 2 and Inequality 5, we can derive as
follows:
We have equality in 4, only if t = 2 and mj = 2. So the two 
methods generate password space of the same size only when 
t = 2 and mj = 2.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PASSWORD SPACE OF CMAPS
Proof: According to the description of CMAPS in 
Section V-A, one gesture can select one game piece and 
put the game piece onto the game board. So one gesture 
in CMAPS is equivalent to one time of information fusion 
in MAPS. The process of generating one l-gesture CMAPS 
password can be equivalently divided into three phases:
(1) In the first phase, l game pieces are selected in order.
(2) In the second phase, l tiles on the chess board are selected.
(3) In the third phase, the selected l game pieces are put onto 
the selected l tiles one by one according to the piece selection 
order.
In the first phase, the number of possible permutations of l 
game pieces is 2l6l because there are two colors and six types 
of game pieces available for choices and the color facet is 
independent from the facet of the piece type. We calculate the 
number of possible permutations of l game pieces instead of 
combination of l game pieces to remove duplicate passwords 
generated because of different orders of putting game pieces 
onto a game board. For example, one CMAPS password 
with two white kings on two selected tiles can be created 
in two different ways dependent on which king is first put 
onto the board. But actually, the two passwords created in 
different ways are identical. Even for different types of games 
pieces, different orders of placing selected game pieces onto 
a game board can generate duplicate passwords. So to remove 
the duplicates caused by different orders, we calculate the 
permutation of l game pieces to be put onto the board. The 
permutation can remove duplicates because only one order of 
placing the selected l game pieces onto their corresponding 
tiles is counted in a permutation. We use corresponding tiles 
in the previous sentence to emphasize that the selected pieces 
will be put into selected tiles in the piece selection order.
In the second phase, l tiles are selected for the selected l 
game pieces. Totally there are 64 tiles in the classical 8 × 8 
chess board. So the number of possible combinations of l 
selected tiles is (64l).
In the third phase, the l selected game pieces are put 
onto the l selected tiles according to the piece selection 
order. A selected tile is assigned to a selected game piece 
as follows: (1) The selected tiles are ordered according to 
their row numbers and column numbers in the chess board. 
The tile in the ath row and bth column is labeled as the 
[(a — 1) * 8 + b]th tile. (2) The l selected tiles are ordered 
in a queue according to their labels. (3) Each game piece
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will be assigned to a tile that has the same position in the
queue as the game piece's position in the permutation. For
each permutation of l game pieces, there are 6l4 different
passwords. Given 2l6l permutations, one l-gesture CMAPS 
can generate 2l6l 6l4 possible passwords.
Because of the removal of duplicates in the first phase and 
the arrangement in the third phase, the piece selection and the 
piece placement are independent. So in the final step of the 
derivation, we can use multiplication to obtain the number of 
possible passwords. □
APPENDIX C
AN IMPLEMENTATION OF A SINGLE-GESTURE CMAPS
Figure 8 shows the possibility of finishing one CMAPS pass­
word with one long gesture. In our future work, we will inves­
tigate whether users will actually use one gesture to finish 
CMAPS passwords. The popularity of the pattern unlock on 
Android systems shows users' preference on authentication 
with one long gesture.
FIGURE 8. One Gesture that completes a cmaps password of four game 
pieces (The gesture starts from the white knight. For visual clarity, we use 
different colors to draw segments to place different game pieces.)
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